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THE RISE OF AGRARIAN CAPITALISM WITH 
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: 
AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION, AGRIBUSINESS 
AND COLLECTIVE LAND RIGHTS 
Qian Forrest Zhang and John A. Donaldson* 
Hundreds of thousands of customers crowd into the 370 outlets of Kentucky Fried 
Chicken in Chinese cities every day. Where does the fast-food giant source the 
vast amount of chicken to feed such demand? In the United States, this would 
come from large-scale chicken farms and poultry-processing plants, but what 
about in China, where the rural reform begun three decades ago reinstated small 
rural households as the unit of production? How do the millions of small 
household agricultural producers in China meet the volume and standard 
demanded by fast food giants like KFC? 
Xinchang Foods, located in Shandong Province's Changyi County, is a major 
supplier of poultry meat to KFC, as well as to other brands like Yum! Brands and 
Wendy's. It has an estimated capacity to process 200,000 chickens each day. 
However, the chickens and ducks that the company processes are still raised by 
individual farmer households scattered around Changyi and neighboring counties. 
Forty per cent of the company's poultry comes from approximately 10,000 farmer 
households who signed contracts with the company to supply chickens and ducks 
of specified quality. Another 40 to 50 per cent comes from production bases set 
up by the company in the area, which lease farm land from rural collective 
organizations and employ local farmers. 
Xinchang Foods and the tens of thousands of farmers who produce for the 
company are part of a major trend that is rapidly transforming agricultural production 
and rural life in China. Responding to market opportunities and government 
initiatives, agribusiness companies like Xinchang Foods and farmers like those in 
Changyi County are re-organizing the distribution and utilization of productive 
The authors acknowledge the research grant support from Singapore Management 
University's Office of Research. We thank Professor Cheng Housi of Yunnan University 
of Nationalities for facilitating fieldwork in Yunnan. Useful comments from three 
anonymous reviewers and the editors of The China Journal are also acknowledged. 
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factors?labor, land and capital?and transforming the traditional household 
based operation toward scaled-up, specialized, commercialized and vertically 
integrated agriculture. 
In what forms are agribusinesses entering agriculture and interacting with 
farmers? How are land, labor and capital now controlled by corporate and 
individual actors, and then organized into agricultural production? How does such 
control and organization shape the relationships between the actors? In this article 
we argue that agrarian capitalism is expanding in China. The means of 
production, such as capital and land, are increasingly controlled by agribusiness, 
while direct producers increasingly sell their labor for a living. We document 
various forms in which agribusiness companies are conducting transactions with 
individual agricultural producers. We also argue that China's unique system of 
land rights?featuring collective ownership but individualized usage rights?has 
acted as a powerful force in shaping interactions between agribusiness and direct 
producers. It provides farmers with a source of economic income and political 
bargaining power, and restricts corporate actors from dispossessing farmers of 
their land. We find strong norms protecting farmers' collective land rights in the 
agricultural sector, contrary to the received wisdom about weak protection of land 
rights in China. 
In the rest of the paper, we first review the policy context in which this 
transformation has taken place. Next we introduce our method of data collection, 
summarize the five forms of agribusiness-farmer interaction found in our study, 
and analyze each of the five forms in depth. We conclude with a discussion of the 
causes and characteristics of the rise of agrarian capitalism, with a focus on the 
role of the land rights system. 
The Household Responsibility System and its Discontents 
The Household Responsibility System (HRS) started by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 
brought land use rights to rural households, providing more leeway for farmers to 
select crops and to market surplus production.1 Agricultural productivity increased 
sharply in the years following the reform, due to the new incentives introduced by 
the new land system, combined with increases in grain procurement prices and 
other actions of the state.2 The HRS is credited with bringing, nearly single 
1 David Zweig, Freeing China 's Farmers: Rural Restructuring in the Reform Era (Armonk: 
M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Daniel Kelliher, Peasant Power in China: The Era of Rural Reform, 
1979-1989 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). 
2 For effects of enhanced incentives, see Justin Yifu Lin, "Rural Reforms and Agricultural 
Growth in China", American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 1 (1992), pp. 34-51; John 
McMillan, John Whalley and Lijing Zhu, "The Impact of China's Economic Reforms on 
Agricultural Productivity Growth", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 4 (1989), 
pp. 781-807; for effects of state policies, see Terry Sicular, "Redefining State, Plan and 
Market: China's Reforms in Agricultural Commerce", The China Quarterly, No. 144 
(December 1995), pp. 1020-64; David Zweig, Freeing China's Farmers', John A. 
Donaldson, "The State, the Market, Economic Growth and Poverty in China", Politics and 
Policy, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2007), pp. 898-929. 
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handedly, hundreds of millions of poor farmers out of poverty?the fastest rate of 
rural poverty reduction in world history. By the end of the mid-1980s, however, 
the central government's investment in agriculture dwindled, as the government's 
attention and resources turned to urban development while fiscal decentralization 
saddled local governments with increasingly stringent fiscal discipline and 
declining revenue transfers from higher-level governments.3 During much of the 
1990s, agricultural growth stagnated.4 
By putting individual households in charge of small and often scattered pieces 
of contracted farm land, the HRS reinstated farmers' incentives, which were 
sharply curtailed under collectivized farming. At the same time, however, this 
move also reduced the scale of Chinese agriculture and reduced levels of 
mechanization. 5 Although in the years immediately following the reform 
production began to exceed the strict boundaries of the household in some 
cases?with some families hiring outside labor and renting the land of others6? 
the presence of large-scale production and the role of agribusiness in the process 
of growing crops was quite muted. To be sure, firms were involved in the 
processing and distribution of agricultural products but, by-and-large, in the vast 
majority of China, production was contained largely within small and scattered 
plots of land and carried out by members of rural households with severely 
constrained capital. 
Critics of decollectivization?from the left, right and center?lamented the 
potential loss of productivity caused by dividing communal land.7 The "scattered, 
3 
Christine P. W. Wong, "Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: the Paradox 
of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China", The China Quarterly, No. 128 (December 
1991), pp. 691-715; Jean C. Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political 
Economy of Village Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 4 
Loren Brandt, Jikun Huang, Guo Li and Scott Rozelle, "Land Rights in Rural China: 
Facts, Fictions, and Issues", The China Journal, No. 47, (January 2002), pp. 67-97; R. W. 
Mead, "A Revisionist View of Chinese Agricultural Productivity?", Contemporary 
Economic Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2003), pp. 117-31; Azizur Rahman Khan and Carl 
Riskin, Inequality and Poverty in China in the Age of Globalization (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
5 
There are of course numerous areas in China, especially in wheat-growing areas, where 
mechanized farming still prevails. See, for example, Andrew B. Kipnis, Producing 
Guanxi: Sentiment, Self, and Subculture in a North China Village (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1997). 
6 
See, for instance, Jonathan Unger, The Transformation of Rural China (Armonk: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2002). 
7 
William H. Hinton, The Privatization of China: The Great Reversal (London: Earthscan 
Publications Ltd., 1991); Xiao-yuan Dong, "Two-Tier Land Tenure System and Sustained 
Economic Growth in Post-1978 Rural China", World Development, Vol. 24, No. 5 (1996), 
pp. 915-28; Guo Li, Scott Rozelle and Loren Brandt, "Tenure, Land Rights, and Farmer 
Investment Incentives in China", Agricultural Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1-2 (1998), pp. 63 
71; Loren Brandt, Jikun Huang, Guo Li and Scott Rozelle, "Land Rights in Rural China"; 
Chris Bramall, "Chinese Land Reform in Long-Run Perspective and in the Wider East 
Asian Context", Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 4, No. 1-2 (2004), pp. 107-41; R. W. 
Mead, "A Revisionist View of Chinese Agricultural Productivity?". 
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small and weak" nature8 of household-based farming created two major problems 
for agricultural productivity. First, it made it difficult for producers to use modern 
farming equipment and thus resulted in a loss of economy of scale. Second, it 
made farmers more vulnerable to the risks and shocks associated with specialized 
commercial farming. For individual farmers, the costs associated with obtaining 
accurate and timely market information, acquiring the necessary skills and 
equipment needed for new commercial crops, and marketing the harvest to 
consumers are often prohibitively high. As a result, farmers tend to ensure 
survival first. Although they do produce cash crops, they are reluctant to adopt 
new technologies or crop varieties, or respond to market opportunities.9 
Stagnation in agricultural production led to widespread calls for new 
measures to increase agricultural output. Proposed solutions included further 
developing and disseminating agricultural technology, securing farmers' land 
rights or even privatizing farm land to enhance farmers' incentives, and, of the 
most interest to this study, scaling up production to achieve economies of scale by 
introducing large enterprises and modern technologies into agriculture. To reduce 
productivity loss caused by land reform, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan had all 
worked to consolidate the overly parcelized land resulting from their policies of 
land reforms.10 Two decades after the HRS reform, the Chinese government also 
found itself battling the negative legacies of that reform. 
Interestingly, in the road map for China's rural development, the central 
leadership under Deng Xiaoping had already identified the next step. In 1990, 
Deng articulated his vision as follows: 
The reform and development of China's socialist agriculture, from the 
long-term perspective, requires two great leaps (liangge feiyue ffi^h^S 
The first leap is dismantling peoples' communes and implementing 
the Household Responsibility reform. This is a great advance and should 
be maintained in the long term. The second leap is meeting the needs of 
scientific agriculture and socialized production, properly developing 
scaled-up operation, and developing the collective economy.11 
8 This is often summarized in Chinese literature as "scattered, small and weak" (san, xiao, 
ruo ffc> /K |?). 
9 Chinese scholars summarize this problem as "small farmers vs. big markets" (xiao nonghu 
da shichang 'bfef* > ^ff?lO 
10 On other governments' consolidation efforts, see Chris Bramall, "Chinese Land Reform in 
Long-Run Perspective", It is, however, a debatable issue as to whether land consolidation 
really leads to productivity gains. If farm size increases, but not to the extent of allowing 
mechanization and not associated with increased labor input, land productivity may 
actually decline due to reduced per unit labor input and a lower intensity of land-use. Land 
consolidation has to be carried out in certain specific ways?for example, moving land to 
more efficient users?to increase productivity. See Qian Forrest Zhang, "Retreat from 
Equality or Advance toward Efficiency? Land Markets and Inequality in Rural Zhejiang", 
The China Quarterly, No. 195 (September 2008) for a discussion. 
11 
Xiaoping Deng, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: 
Renmin Chubanshe [The People's Publishing House], 1993) p. 355. 
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These "Two Leaps" have since become the guiding vision for the central 
government's agricultural policies. Deng further elaborated: "the rural economy 
eventually needs to become collectivized (jitihua j^kWVC) and coordinated 
(jiyuehua M&lik) ... agricultural modernization is impossible if each household 
works on its own".12 Since Deng had completed the first leap, Deng's successors 
needed to make the second leap. 
The policy shift from HRS to the second leap started in the mid-1990s. The 
central leadership under Jiang Zemin started to articulate "agricultural 
modernization" in more concrete terms by proposing policies in a series of policy 
statements: the Ninth Five-Year Plan (passed in 1996), Jiang's report to the 15th 
Party Congress in 1997, and the 1998 document of "Decisions by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Several Key Issues in Rural and 
Agricultural Works" which was issued in 1998. The central leadership stated 
clearly that the goal of agricultural modernization (nongye xiandai hua ^4kSM^ 
ik) was to make the transition from traditional to modern agriculture and from 
uncoordinated and low-scale operation (cufangshi jingying IE M ^ ^ H) to 
coordinated and large-scale operation (jiyueshi jingying ?^^lrlf). The central 
government characterized a modernized agriculture as commercialized (shangpin 
hua $*Jpptti), specialized (zhuanye hua i?^lk|fc), scaled up (guimo hua MW?ik)9 
standardized (biaozhun hua ^Mik) and internationalized (guoji hua H Wik). 
The central leadership also identified agricultural vertical integration (chanye 
hua /^ikft) as the main means to achieve agricultural modernization.13 Vertical 
integration refers to two parallel processes: first, scaling up production of a crop 
in a region, because without a large enough volume harvested, further processing 
and marketing of the crop will not be economically viable;14 and, second, 
integrating cultivation with processing and marketing. The central government 
believes that vertical integration helps to bring farmers into markets and to bring 
modern technologies into farming. At the center of the government's vertical 
integration campaign is the promotion of "dragon head" agribusiness companies 
(Jongtou qiye ~M^k4ti&L) as vehicles for vertical integration.15 Both central and 
12 
Xiaoping Deng, Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975-97 (Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping, 1975? 
97) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe [The Central Archives Press], 2004) 
pp. 1349-50. 
13 
Throughout this article, we use "agricultural modernization", or "modern agriculture", to 
refer to the mode of agricultural production including specialization, vertical integration, 
corporatization, commercialization and large scale. We refrain, however, from making 
claims about whether this modernized agriculture is necessarily more efficient, which is an 
empirical question that needs to be answered with data. 
14 The scaling up here, however, does not necessarily mean that production needs to be done 
at a supra-household level. It could simply mean that more households in a region shift to 
growing a certain crop, so the scale of production for that crop increases in a region. 
15 Scott Waldron, Colin Brown and John Longworth, Rural Development in China: Insights 
from the Beef Industry (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); Scott Waldron, Colin Brown and John 
Longworth, "State Sector Reform and Agriculture in China", The China Quarterly, No. 
186 (June 2006), pp. 277-94. 
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local governments can bestow "dragon head" status to agribusiness companies. 
The designated "dragon head" enterprises can receive government support, 
including easier access to loans from state banks, but the criteria of designating 
"dragon head" enterprises is more lenient the further one moves down the 
administrative hierarchy. Consequently, local "dragon head" enterprises often 
receive nothing more than the title. Nevertheless, agribusiness companies have 
proliferated in recent years. One survey found that in 2004 there were 114,000 
officially recognized "dragon head" enterprises nationwide?a four-fold increase 
from 27,000 in 2000?and that 84.5 million rural households were working with 
these companies.16 
In light of these developments, we contend that the second leap has indeed 
started and China's agricultural development is entering its fourth reorganization, 
following land reform, collectivization and the HRS. Yet this shift in rural China 
has barely been discussed in English-language literature.17 This paper addresses 
this silence. 
Selecting Cases, Identifying Pathways 
Publications in Chinese sources have shown that the rise of agribusiness is a 
nationwide phenomenon.18 Our fieldwork was conducted in 2007 in different 
localities within two Chinese provinces, though we also draw on insights from 
previous fieldwork in other provinces and from secondary sources. Since patterns 
of growth of agribusiness may vary between coastal and inland provinces, we 
visited one province in China's east (Shandong) and one in the inland (Yunnan). 
For each province, we researched agricultural products which have seen the 
expansion of agribusiness and the implementation of vertical integration. 
Vertical integration first started in Shandong during the early 1990s as a 
spontaneous experiment by local officials, not unlike the experiment with 
16 See Ruofeng Niu, "Zhongguo nongye chanyehua jingying de fazhan tedian yu fangxiang" 
(Development Characteristics and Directions in Agricultural Vertical Integration in 
China), Zhongguo nongcun jingji (The Rural Economy of China), Vol. 2002, No. 5 
(2002), pp. 4-8, for results from a 2000 survey, and Yun Zhang, "Nongye chanyehua ji 
jingrong tuidong wenti yanjiu" (A Study on Agricultural Vertical Integration and Its 
Financial Support), Huatai caijing zhengquan fenxi (Huatai Finance and Securities 
Analysis), No. 8 (2006), pp. 57-64 for the 2004 figures. 
17 Scott Waldron, Colin Brown and John Longworth, "State Sector Reform and Agriculture 
in China", p. 292. 
18 
See, for example, Ruofeng Niu, "Zhongguo nongye chanyehua jingying de fazhan tedian 
yu fangxiang"; Jiaji Chen, Guoyu Yang and Xiaohui Wu, "Lun nongye jingying dahu" 
(On Big Farming Households), Zhongguo nongcun jingji, No. 4 (2007), pp. 12-17; 
Xiaoming Guo, Zujun Liao and Rao Fu, "Longtou qiye daidong xing, zhongjie zuzhi 
liandong xing he hezuoshe yitihua sanzhong nongye chanyehua moshi de bijiao: jiyu 
zhidu jingjixue shijiao de fenxi" (A Comparison of Agricultural Vertical Integration Led 
by Dragon Head Enterprises, Intermediary Organizations, and Integrated Cooperatives: 
An Analysis from the Perspective of Institutional Economics), Zhongguo nongcun jingji, 
No. 4 (2007), pp. 40-47. 
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decollectivization by desperate farmers in Anhui and Sichuan in 1978.19 Shandong 
has since maintained a leading position in agricultural modernization in the 
country and has become the leading producer of vegetables, poultry and fruit.20 
Shandong thus provides the fullest demonstration of agribusiness growth. We 
selected one case from each of the three biggest sectors of modern agriculture in 
Shandong: poultry in Changyi County, vegetables in Shouguang County and fruit 
in Binzhou County. Among the inland and western provinces, we selected 
Yunnan because its unique natural endowment gives it an edge in profitable 
commercial crops such as coffee, rubber and flowers. In Yunnan, we examined 
tea, coffee, wasabi (Japanese horse radish), vegetables, fresh-cut flowers, fruit 
and rubber across five diverse sub-provincial regions: Baoshan, Kunming, Pu'er 
(formerly Simao), Xishuangbanna and Zhaotong. In traditional strongholds of 
grain production (the three Northeastern provinces and central provinces like 
Henan), the progress of vertical integration may be markedly different from that 
in Shandong and Yunnan. 
During our fieldwork, we interviewed government officials, farmers, 
entrepreneurs, managers, staff and others who were involved in growing, harvesting, 
marketing and processing the selected agricultural products. In addition, we 
visited areas that were producing these products to see firsthand the changes that 
were occurring?both in the field and in farmers' homes. In each of these areas, 
capitalistic forms and relations of production have emerged with the participation 
of agribusiness. During our fieldwork, we encountered agribusinesses of different 
sizes, origins and descriptions. The involvement of such businesses both required 
and created a scale of production that exceeded the household, in terms either of 
land or labor, or of both. 
In the rest of this paper we depict five distinct forms of interactions between 
agribusiness and farmers, arranged based on the different ways in which agribusiness 
organizes production and relates with the direct producers?the farmers. Overall, 
this typology identifies multiple pathways through which agribusiness is leading 
the growth of agrarian capitalism in rural China (see Table).21 
19 How farmers' experimented with decollectivization is a well-told story. See, for example, 
Justin Yifu Lin, "The Household Responsibility System Reform in China: A Peasant's 
Institutional Choice", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 69, No. 2 (1987), 
pp. 410-15. See Shumin Han, "Shandongsheng Weifangshi nongcun hezuo jingji zuzhi 
fazhan zhuangkuang diaocha" (An Investigation of the Development of Rural Economic 
Cooperatives in Weifang City, Shandong Province), Zhongguo nongcun jingji, No. 8 
(2007), pp. 56-63 for the spontaneous start of vertical integration. 
20 
Hongbing Li, "Zai nongye chanyehua fazhan zhong peiyu he tigao nongmin zuzhihua 
chengdu yanjiu" (A Study on Nurturing and Strengthening the Organization of Farmers 
through Developing Agricultural Vertical Integration), Nongye jingji wenti (Issues in 
Agricultural Economy), No. 1 (2008), pp. 99-102. 
21 In organizing these forms on a table, we do not imply a stage model, as if forms will shift 
successively up or down the forms on this table. Instead, we see these forms as parallel 
pathways that co-exist, at least for a time. One does not necessarily lead to another. 
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Table: Relationships between Agribusiness and Farmers in China 
A Typology 
Form Role for 
Agribusiness 
Role for Direct 
Producers 












3. Form bases 
Semi- through leasing 
proletarian village farmland, 
with Chinese hire villagers 
characteristics 
4. Form bases 
Semi- through leasing 
proletarian wasteland, hire 
farm workers migrant laborers 
5. Form bases 
Proletarian through leasing 
farm workers wasteland, hire 
landless laborers 
Work All for 
independently on commercial 
allocated family exchange 
land 
Direct producers 
can be dominated 
by purchasers 
through unfair 
terms of trade. 
Work on 
allocated family 














land at home 
Landless, work 
on company land 
as employees 
Sold to Direct producers 
contracting are dominated by 
companies the company, but 
retain some 
flexibility. 
Belongs to Direct producers 
the company are dominated by 
the company, but 
enjoy a degree of 
entitlement. 
Belongs to Direct producers 
the company are dominated by 
the company, but 
have family land as 
fall-back option. 
Belongs to Direct producers 
the company are completely 
dominated by the 
company. 
As we move through this typology, we find variations along two dimensions: 
first, the control over?and use of?labor and land changes. Across these forms, 
agribusiness firms have varying degrees of control over labor and land vis-?-vis 
direct producers. Second, with changes in the control over land and/or labor, 
social relationships between actors also change. Most notably, the power 
relationship between rural residents (whether acting as contractors or farm 
workers) and the agricultural firm is strikingly different in each form. In all cases, 
the institution of land rights plays a crucial role in shaping such relationships. We 
argue that the collective land rights system in rural China allows rural residents to 
resist acquisition by agribusiness of more control over farm land. With this in 
mind, we sharply disagree with growing calls to eliminate this institution and 
privatize farm land in China. 
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Form 1: Commercial Farmers 
By commercial farmer, we refer to rural households that grow crops exclusively 
for commercial exchange, and meet their subsistence and other needs by buying 
grain on markets instead of by growing it. Although many rural households have 
long participated in the market by selling surplus grain or economic crops, 
"commercial farmers" move completely out of producing subsistence crops. 
Such commercialization brings important changes to farmer households. 
While still relying on family labor and contracted family land, these households 
derive their subsistence from markets, which often link them with remote actors 
and social processes that lie beyond the local village community. It also exposes 
them to unforeseeable risks emanating from a diverse set of sources, including 
false or untimely market information, fraudulent transaction partners and price 
fluctuation. Furthermore, the cost associated with the storage, transportation, 
preliminary processing and marketing of the crops are prohibitively high for 
isolated individual farmer households. Thus, unless there are some intermediary 
agents helping to lower transaction costs and stabilize markets, farmers often rely 
on subsistence farming as a survival-first strategy.22 
Commercial farming by rural households, not a new phenomenon in rural 
China,23 was eliminated under collectivization. Its re-emergence depended on the 
marketization of agricultural products, without which the commercial households 
could neither sell their crop nor buy grain. In the 1980s, local governments 
attempted to coordinate marketization and facilitate the development of commercial 
farming, with limited success.24 Now, a diverse set of agribusiness firms are 
22 
See James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in 
Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) for the classical statement on 
subsistence farmers' survival-first strategy. See Housi Cheng, "Bianyuan yu gudao: 
guanyu Yunnan shaoshu minzu diqu pinkun chengyin de yizhong jieshi" (Peripheries and 
Islands: An Explanation on the Cause of Poverty in Ethnic Minority Regions in Yunnan), 
Zhongguo nongcun guancha (China Rural Observations), Vol. 1999, No. 6 (1999), 
pp. 603-10, for an analysis of its manifestation among Chinese farmers. This problem has 
also been discussed by Lansheng Sun, "Guanyu dingdan nongye de jingjixue fenxi" (An 
Economic Analysis of Contract Farming), Nongye fazhan yu jingrong (Agricultural 
Development and Finance), No. 6 (2006), pp. 11-27. 
23 
Philip C. C. Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 
1350-1988 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), for example, documented 
the highly developed commercial farming in the Yangtze River Delta in the late 
Imperial period. 
24 
Many of such state-led development plans failed disastrously. For example, Scott Rozelle, 
Linxiu Zhang and Jikun Huang, "China's War on Poverty" (Stanford: Stanford University, 
2000), Working Paper, No. 60, pp. 1-51, describe a state-initiated project to encourage 
farmers in one poor region to produce frozen rabbits. Ultimately, the project failed due to 
the farmers' lack of experience and training, and nearly every household lost its entire 
investment. Moreover, officials, far from being blamed, actually received funding for a 
second phase of this initiative, which they invested in non-poor villages. 
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acting as intermediary agents, lowering transaction costs and providing stable 
markets to commercial farmers. 
The trailblazer in Yunnan's coffee industry was the Swiss multinational firm 
Nestle. When it started in 1989, in addition to introducing coffee varieties suited 
to the local climate, Nestle also provided, upon request, technical training and 
assistance to farmers inexperienced in this trade. The company also provided 
training to local technicians, on the condition that they subsequently train farmers 
in coffee production. This training has been popular: by 2007, Nestle had held 66 
programs and trained, free of charge, over 2,000 local coffee growers.25 Over 18 
years, Nestle has gradually developed the two sub-tropical regions of Pu'er and 
Xishuangbanna in Yunnan into a base that provides a steady supply of quality 
coffee beans to be processed into instant coffee in its factories in Dongguan, 
Guangdong, for the domestic market. Nestle, however, does not enter into any 
formal or contractual relationship with coffee growers. The company did not and 
could not force farmers to shift from grain to coffee. It merely purchases directly 
from farmers at the current global market price, through a number of buying 
stations which it established to facilitate the transaction. Through its long 
presence in the region and the large volume of purchase (Nestle now buys more 
than 5,000 tons of beans from Pu'er Municipality, a third of the region's total 
output), Nestle has provided a stable market for local commercial coffee growers, 
reducing risks and thus encouraging farmers to shift to coffee. 
On the other side of the grower-purchaser equation are farmers like Mr Chen 
and his wife. The Chens, living in the rural areas of Pu'er Municipality, have 
shifted from growing corn to growing coffee beans. This shift occurred over a 
series of steps. At first, while he and his family tended the corn on his own plot, 
Mr Chen worked in an ad hoc manner at Beigui, a local coffee-growing town and 
village enterprise (TVE), where he earned cash to supplement his subsistence 
farming and also learned the skill of growing coffee. Soon afterwards, just as 
Nestle started buying coffee beans in the area, Mr Chen switched from working 
for Beigui to growing coffee beans on his family's land. Like most of his 
neighbors, Mr Chen soon moved completely out of growing corn. Then, as now, 
the family sells exclusively to Nestle, which has proven to be a dependable buyer, 
purchasing coffee beans at the international price (some computer-savvy farmers 
even check the international price on the Internet). The family owns some 
preliminary processing equipment, with which they shell, clean, dry and split 
coffee beans before delivering them to Nestle. The family also purchased a truck, 
their second, which they use to deliver the coffee to Nestle's buying station and to 
purchase grain, inputs and other needs. Through growing coffee, the Chens have 
been able to afford to send their children to schools in the municipal seat, where 
they live during the week. 
25 All figures cited about our cases, unless otherwise stated, are from interviews and 
fieldwork. 
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Risks associated with commercial farming are still clearly on the minds of 
both Nestle and the coffee growers. What concerns Nestle is farmers pulling up 
their coffee shrubs and shifting to other crops when the market price falls (which 
happened in 2001 and 2002), affecting the steady supply that it needs. The 
company's representatives in Pu'er therefore encourage farmers to grow more 
than just one crop to hedge their risk and also to maintain a sustainable coffee 
operation. Farmers who ignore this advice, like the Chens, are directly exposed to 
the perils associated with bad weather and falling price. The 1999 frost, in fact, 
resulted in large losses for the Chen family but, thanks to the capital they had 
accumulated in previous years, they avoided bankruptcy and the damaged shrubs 
grew back the next year. 
In order to shift out of grain production into a commercial crop, most rural 
families require some type of outside impetus. In some cases, when roads (even 
humble dirt roads) link local areas to marketing towns and beyond, middlemen 
can come in to purchase such crops, inducing households to increase commercial 
production. Often, however, entrepreneurs and companies provide the needed 
access to skill, capital and market. In the Chens' case, the initial outside stimulus 
was the Beigui Coffee Company. This local, subsequently privatized, TVE 
provided Mr Chen with the chance to gain skills in growing coffee, as well as to 
acquire much-needed cash. Subsequently, the relatively stable market provided by 
Nestle encouraged the Chens to shift exclusively to growing and processing 
coffee beans. 
Commercial farmers like the Chens enter into new sets of relationships with 
individual, corporate and state actors, who often mediate their interactions with 
markets. In such relations, agribusiness firms exert no control over the land or 
labor which belongs to the direct producers. The commercial farmers are usually 
not under any direct domination or exploitation, other than the unfavorable terms 
of trade they may endure on the open market. 
Form 2: Contract Farmers 
In dealing with independent commercial farmers, agribusiness has to face the 
uncertainty of fluctuating supply caused by farmers shifting in and out of a 
commercial crop?sometimes dramatically?when prices for that crop change. 
One solution to that problem is to establish a formal contractual relationship with 
farmers, usually in a contiguous area. In this relationship, the company typically 
provides farmers with technology, training, service and, in many cases, start-up 
capital. Although the farming households retain control over their household land 
and their own labor, in return for company support they sign a contract, generally 
locking them into a selling price, with the promise to sell their entire harvest to 
the company. We call these households "contract farmers". 
One of the many examples that we discovered of this type of production is 
Xinchang Foods, a Shandong poultry-meat processing company, whose story 
opened this article. In addition to the poultry-processing facilities, this company 
also has two plants for processing microwavable food, such as TV dinners. Each 
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day, the company processes an estimated 200,000 chickens and 60 tons of pre 
cooked food. Established in 1988, the company now reportedly employs more 
than 8,000 people, and has revenue in excess of 800 million yuan. Xinchang 
Foods had been a state-owned enterprise under the grain bureau, but was changed 
in 2001 to a shareholding company totally divested from the bureau, with all 
workers holding stocks in the company. The company estimates that about 40 per 
cent of its meat supply comes from its approximately 10,000 contract farming 
households.26 It provides baby chickens and ducklings, two to three days after 
hatching, to the participating farmers, as well as feed, basic equipment, vaccines 
and medicines, and management advice. The company guarantees a minimum, or 
"protective", price {baohu jia f?zffiift), pays immediately upon delivery and 
overall has established a solid relationship with the farmers over the course of the 
previous decade. 
Farmers who produce under contract with this company confirm much that 
the company says. Mr Zhao, for instance, husbands more than 8,600 ducks for the 
company. In this manner, he can earn 1500 yuan on average each month. 
However, he does argue that the company uses its size and market position to 
hold down the purchasing price. Mr Zhao lives in an urbanizing area and his 
family land has shrunk from 1.7 mu per capita to about 0.3 mu, because of land 
expropriation by the state for urban expansion. Now, instead of growing grain, 
Mr Zhao and his family dedicate most of their land to raising ducklings, retaining 
a small plot for growing melons and vegetables. Given their limited land, animal 
husbandry might be one of the few viable options that the Zhao family has left in 
agriculture. In instances like these, when household land shrinks dramatically due 
to urban sprawl, agribusiness makes it viable for farm families to continue in 
agriculture. In his relationship with Xinchang Foods, Mr Zhao retains his entitlement 
to land use rights provided by the village collective. Nevertheless, he has 
relegated much of the control over production and the final products to the 
company, which has the sole purchasing rights (monopsony) over the products. 
We saw many other examples of this form of agribusiness-led agricultural 
modernization. For example, in a very poor area of northeastern Yunnan's 
Zhaotong Municipality, farmers signed contracts with a local entrepreneur (a 
former local government official) to grow Japanese horseradish (the crop that 
produces wasabi) for export to Japan. In exchange for signing the contract, 
farmers received training and the start-up capital needed to grow this expensive 
crop. Many coffee and tea processing firms in Yunnan have also established 
production bases with contract farmers. Cases like this are also widely reported in 
Chinese publications, as well as in English-language journals.27 
26 A further 40 to 50 per cent of their production comes from a more formal contract with 
village governments, the third form in our typology, discussed below. 
27 For Chinese publications, see, for example, Fengqin Liu, "Buwanquan heyue yu luyue 
zhang'ai: yi dingdan nongye weili" (Incomplete Contracts and Obstacles to Contract 
Enforcement: The Example of Contract Farming), Jingji yanjiu (Economic Research 
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Like the commercial farmers who have given up subsistence agriculture and 
now rely on production of commercial crops, these contract farmers grow 
economic crops for commercial exchange, deal with outside actors and buy food 
on the market for their own consumption. However, because of their lack of 
access to capital, market or skill, contract farmers have to enter into formal 
contractual relationships with a more powerful and resourceful corporate actor. 
Contracted farmers commit legally to selling only to the contracting company. By 
providing them with the needed capital, skill and/or market access, the corporate 
actor reduces contract farmers' negotiating power and profit margin. In this 
relationship, farmers provide only labor and land. 
Theoretically, contract farmers do enjoy one advantage: they can shield 
themselves from market risks by obtaining protective prices for their products.28 
In our fieldwork, we routinely found farmers, and sometimes even local 
governments, who tried to obtain protective prices from contracting companies, 
often to no avail. County governments in Yunnan's Baoshan Municipality, for 
example, demanded a protective price from Nestle when the latter floated the idea 
of establishing a production base there. These demands only pushed Nestle away 
to Pu'er, where the company encountered no such requirement.29 Even when a 
protective price is specified in the contract, however, it may not help in real terms. 
In the case of Mr Zhao, for example, when market price dropped below the 
protective price, the company simply raised prices for the feed and medicines that 
they sold to farmers to offset the above-market margin it paid for the ducks. 
Due to the dominant position of corporate actors, contract farmers like Mr 
Zhao are typically not as well off as independent commercial farmers. Partly in 
response to their unfavorable position vis-?-vis the companies, contract farmers 
often violate contracts and sell some of their harvest to other purchasers who offer 
higher prices. Companies call this the "middleman problem", after the itinerant 
Journal), No. 4 (2003), pp. 1-22; Kaiwen Feng, "Cunmin zizhi, hezuoshe he nongye 
chanyehua jingying zhidu de xietiao yanjing: laizi Shandong Yantai de diaocha baogao" 
(Co-Evolution of Rural Self-Governance, Cooperatives and the Institution of 
Industrialized Agricultural Production: A Survey Report from Yantai, Shandong), 
Zhongguo nongcun jingji (Chinese Rural Economy), No. 2 (2003), pp. 45-50; for English 
publications, see Dinghuan Hu, Thomas Reardon, Scott Rozelle, Peter Timmer and 
Honglin Wang, "The Emergence of Supermarkets with Chinese Characteristics: 
Challenges and Opportunities for China's Agricultural Development", Development 
Policy Review, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2004), pp. 557-86; Hongdong Guo, Robert W. Jolly and 
Jianhua Zhu, "Contract Farming in China: Perspectives of Farm Households and 
Agribusiness Firms", Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2007), pp. 285-312. 
28 In their survey, Guo et al. found that only 27.3 per cent of contracts in their survey 
featured a price floor, with 23 per cent based on a fixed price. The remaining 44 per cent 
of these contracts were based on the market price, offering farmers little protection. See 
Hongdong Guo, Robert W. Jolly and Jianhua Zhu, "Contract Farming in China". 
29 Sources in Nestle, however, denied that the idea of a production base in Baoshan was ever 
put forward. 
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middlemen who drive around and secretly purchase products from companies' 
production bases. In other cases, contract farmers cut corners in the production 
process, resulting in product defects.30 
The middleman problem and corner-cutting have led to the dissolution of 
many contractual relationships. One report finds that, within the studied area, 
some 80 per cent of the contracts between firms and farmers had been breached 
by one party or the other.31 Another survey of contract farmers in Shandong's 
Yantai Municipality found that 90 per cent of farmers said that they would breach 
their contracts if a better price was offered on the market.32 In fact, Nestle started 
its coffee operation in Yunnan with the contract farming model, only to abandon 
it later because of the rampant middleman problem. Companies that have 
managed to maintain their production bases and fend off middlemen rely on 
personal relationships, market monopsony or geographical inaccessibility.33 Due 
to these difficulties, we believe that contract farming as a form of agrarian 
capitalism is unstable and likely to be transient, changing to either commercial 
farming or to the form that we discuss next.34 
Form 3: Semi-Proletarian Farm Workers with Chinese Characteristics 
From a contracting company's perspective, a long-term solution to the middleman 
problem can only come from gaining greater control over the growing and 
harvesting process and changing farmers' incentive structure. One way of doing 
this is to establish production bases by renting the land (use rights) from the 
collective owner, the village, and hiring village residents (who, as members of the 
collective, are entitiled to land use rights) as company employees to work on the 
land. In some cases, rural households still work on the piece of household land 
allocated to them by the collective?although now rented to the company base? 
growing whatever the company asks them to grow. In other cases, land is 
consolidated and household boundaries erased, and the farmers simply work for 
the company on company land. Even when farmers continue to work on the 
30 See Hongbing Li, "Zai nongye chanyehua fazhan zhong peiyu he tigao nongmin zuzhihua 
chengdu yanjiu", for an example in Shandong where organic vegetable product exported 
to Japan was rejected due to high traces of pesticide. 
31 
Fengqin Liu, "Buwanquan heyue yu luyue zhang'ai: yi dingdan nongye weili". 
32 Kaiwan Feng, "Cunmin zizhi, hezuoshe he nongye chanyehua jingying zhidu de xietiao 
yanjing". 
33 In Mr. Zhao's case, the company prevents him from selling to middlemen by asking for a 
high deposit for each of the ducklings he takes, a measure that may not be easily replicable 
for other crops. 
34 This is consistent with a survey conducted by China's Ministry of Agriculture that reveals 
that, among the different types of relationships between farmer and firm, the proportion of 
contract farming relationships dropped from 70.8 per cent to 49.0 per cent. See Ruofeng 
Niu, "Zhongguo nongye chanyehua jingying de fazhan tedian yu fangxiang", also reported 
in Xiaoming Guo, Zujun Liao and Rao Fu, "Longtou qiye daidong xing, zhongjie zuzhi 
liandong xing he hezuoshe yitihua sanzhong nongye chanyehua moshi de bijiao". 
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allocated household land, a profound change has happened: they are now only 
providing labor in the production process; the land use rights and the right to 
dispose of harvest from the land are controlled by the company. 
We add the appendage "with Chinese characteristics" because, without the 
unique institution of collective land ownership and individualized land use rights 
in rural China, this form might not exist. In this form of agribusiness, the 
companies typically establish contractual relationships with village collective 
authorities, not with individual farmers. Because collective land ownership 
restricts village authorities from disenfranchising rural residents from their land, it 
also restricts companies from denying village residents jobs on company 
production bases. Without such a restriction, an enclosure movement led by 
agribusinesses could easily throw many farmers off their land and into the army 
of reserve labor. 
In this form of vertical integration, farmers become semi-proletarian. They 
still have an entitlement to collective land (and, in fact, often receive rent), but 
they have to sell their labor to the company for wages. In a sense, the farmers 
trade their land use rights for jobs. Their entitlement o collective land gives them 
entitlement to company jobs, and thus, they "own" their jobs in a way unlike fully 
proletarianized workers. 
Like many of the other companies discussed here, Shandong's Yuhua Date 
Company started as a TVE, but was later privatized. In 1987, the company began 
growing dates in bulk, exporting some to outside markets. About one-third of 
their date production takes the form described above. They lease farmers' land for 
30 years from the village collective, and hire village residents to grow, manage 
and harvest date trees. Farm workers are paid individual wages, based on the 
acreage of trees they tend. Yuhua does not pay farm workers for the dates they 
harvest, arguing that the company owns the harvest, while workers' labor has 
already been compensated in wages. Through a team of foremen and managers 
and a hierarchical organizational structure, Yuhua controls and manages the land 
rented and the farm workers hired. As a result, they reportedly have little problem 
with farmers selling their produce to middlemen, which is deemed theft of 
company assets. 
Similarly, Taiwan's Qianhui Flower Company, based in Chenggong County, 
Yunnan, rents 70 per cent of its land from collectives through contracts of at least 
seven years. It then pays villagers a monthly wage to grow and harvest the 
flowers on their own land. This company currently has 10 such bases throughout 
Yunnan, using them to grow a wide variety of flowers in different environments. 
This company emphasized that once the household is contracted, the farmers 
cannot individually withdraw their land from the arrangement, because the land is 
contracted through the village committee. Like Yuhua, Qianhui does not have 
problems with middlemen. It considers selling the product to outsiders a criminal 
offense, and works with local law enforcement agencies to enforce its contracts. 
In a third case, Mr Liu, a naturalized American citizen, created the only cattle 
ranch of scale in Yunnan Province. About half of his land is rented from individual 
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households who then work on his ranch. In yet another case, SinoChem invested 
in rubber plantations in Xishuangbanna, in southern Yunnan. In response to a 
government request to develop the region through the rubber industry, SinoChem 
has also rented three large plots from the collective authorities of three villages. 
The company provides fertilizers and seeds to farmers, who grow and harvest 
rubber trees planted on their own plots of land. The company then manages them 
through a hierarchical structure, with farmers separated into work teams, and each 
team further separated into smaller units. 
In these examples, although the farm workers do benefit economically, they 
clearly lose autonomy. Compared to contract farmers, semi-proletarian farm 
workers have not only relinquished use rights over their collective land (although 
they often receive rent for that) but are also subjected to tighter company control 
in the production process. As a result, they lose control totally over the harvest. 
Despite these shortcomings, when rural residents lack capital and know-how, they 
often benefit financially by making this sort of arrangement with agribusiness. 
From the company's point of view, this form is a relatively painless way to obtain 
control over farm land and overcome the middleman problem. However, 
companies have also found ways to obtain even greater control over their 
employees, the production process and the harvest. 
Form 4: Semi-Proletarian Farm Workers 
Under this form, the company controls the land of its production bases and hires 
rural workers. The farm worker, who migrates to the company's production base, 
still possesses use rights over his or her own land, but that land is elsewhere?and 
has usually been rented out to relatives, neighbors or entrepreneurs. Hence, we 
classify these laborers as "Semi-proletarian Farm Workers": they sell labor for 
wages, yet still retain access to some means of production, although not directly 
used. 
The Dahongpo Coffee Plantation in western Yunnan Province controls a base 
of some 7,000 mu, of which 4,500 mu is currently cultivated with coffee plants. 
Established in 1989, the company began as a TVE led by a vice township head. In 
1998, the government privatized company debt, sorted out the assets and sold the 
entire company to this former local leader. The company leases land that was 
previously classified as wasteland?mostly on mountain slopes?with long-term 
leases that expire in 2030. The company got capital support from the Bank of 
Agriculture and an ear-marked World Bank loan to develop infrastructure. In the 
early years the local government was also involved in attracting poor peasants to 
come and grow coffee on the base. 
At Dahongpo, the entire process of growing and harvesting is tightly 
controlled by the company. Like most others of its kind, this company provides 
land, training, fertilizer, pesticides, seeds and other inputs. The company has a 
hierarchical organizational structure to supervise farm workers. Six hundred or 
more farm workers (in 168 farming households) are divided into four teams, each 
managed by 15 full-time supervisors and technicians. The company passes down 
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orders through this hierarchy on every production procedure, from when to apply 
fertilizer and pesticide to when to start harvesting. Materials such as seeds, 
fertilizers and pesticides are also distributed by the company, through the teams, 
to each worker family. The company does not charge rent, but establishes a 
production quota for each mu of land. The company and farm worker split the 
within-quota harvest on a 6:4 ratio, and 100 per cent of the sales from the above 
quota harvest belongs to the farm worker. Company representatives acknowledge 
that the harvest belongs to the company, but argue that the company chooses to 
give workers a share in the harvest?in lieu of wages?in order to attract workers. 
The company's control of land and close monitoring of the entire production 
process mean that farm workers have much less flexibility than contract farmers, 
who work on their own land. Farm workers not only have great difficulties in 
"stealing" the harvest and selling it to middlemen but they also face dire 
consequences if caught doing so. The company will kick workers off the farm as 
punishment. As a result, company representatives claimed that there is no 
middleman problem. 
Nevertheless, the company gives farm workers a generous cut of the proceeds 
and has provided land for migrant farm workers to build their own housing. The 
ready availability of "wasteland" in the area and the relatively tight labor supply 
(the area has a large minority population, who are less receptive to the idea of 
becoming hired employees) means that the company has to offer better terms to 
attract migrant laborers, whose access to collective land at home also serves to 
strengthen their bargaining power. 
Because of China's collective land system, such companies rarely control 
prime farm land. During interviews, company representatives repeatedly stressed 
that, if they had obtained access to better farm land not burdened with a 
population of entitled villagers, they would not have bothered with the wasteland 
they currently used. When facing the choice of renting collectively owned land 
and then hiring villagers versus opening up wasteland and hiring migrant laborers, 
many companies eschewed the former because of the complex relations that it 
creates between companies, village authorities and villagers. In this form, the 
farm workers' bargaining power is quite constrained, resting in the form of an 
escape clause?the land back home which the worker retains. 
Form 5: Proletarian Farm Workers 
The final form that has emerged in China is similar to the previous type, except 
that the farm workers are landless laborers without alternative livelihoods. The 
Beigui Coffee Company started off in the 1980s as a TVE under the Supply and 
Sales Cooperative (SSC) of Yunnan's Simao Prefecture (now Pu'er 
Municipality), and re-formed as a stockholding company in 1998, with the SSC 
holding the majority stake and workers each holding shares. Of the 10,000-mw 
base that the company controls, half is rented from local farmers and half was 
previously classified as wasteland which the company leased long-term (50 years) 
from the village collective. The operation involves 2,000 farmers, most of whom 
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are stable farm workers who moved their entire families from poor areas, 
primarily Zhaotong Municipality in northeastern Yunnan.35 However, unlike the 
previous forms, the company encourages peasants to give up their land rights in 
their home villages and obtain a local permanent resident permit, which, however, 
does not grant them any entitlement to collective land. These farm workers have 
no land rights either in Pu'er or in their home areas, although they do receive the 
right to participate in local elections at their new residence in Pu'er. In a sense, 
these re-located migrant workers become second-class citizens in their adopted 
villages?they are members of the villages, their children can go to local schools, 
they have most of the political rights of any other villager, but they do not have 
access to collectively-owned land. Their dependence on manual labor is clearly 
shown in the fact that most men in these migrant families have to sell their labor 
in other jobs as temporary workers, while the women do the actual farm work on 
the coffee plantation. 
This arrangement also makes the farm workers closely dependent on the 
company. Workers can earn income from three sources: first, for each mu of 
coffee shrubs under their cultivation, they earn a labor wage of 15 yuan; second, 
as a bonus to give workers more incentive, the company also pays a weight-based 
purchasing fee for the coffee beans; and third, some workers can also earn a 
picking fee during peak harvesting season. Like Dahongpo, Beigui takes total 
control over the production process. Given Beigui's larger size (2000 workers in 
600 households, compared to 600 workers in 168 households at Dahongpo), the 
company organizes their production in a three-tiered hierarchy: company-farms 
teams. While team leaders are selected from farm workers, managerial staff at the 
farm level are full-time employees of the company. Overall, the company is 
supervised by more than 30 salaried staff, managing the production process in a 
top-down manner. 
The company argues that the farmers are far better off today than they used to 
be. Given that these farmers are from one of China's poorest areas, and that they 
do migrate to Baoshan voluntarily, that is likely to be true. The company 
estimates that farm workers earn between 20,000 and 30,000 yuan per household, 
which is far higher than the net rural income of any county in Zhaotong 
Prefecture. While these farm workers benefit financially to some degree and 
emerge from poverty, in political and social terms they have the least bargaining 
power of the farmers that we have discussed. Since land acts as a type of 
insurance policy for poor farmers, the fact that Beigui asks farmers to switch their 
household registrations and therefore lose their original land entitlements makes 
them even more dependent on the company. On the other hand, the company's 
need to attract farmers to work on the base limits the extent to which the company 
can exploit this dependence. 
35 Mr. Chen, described above, is an exception, having worked for years for Beigui as a 
temporary worker. 
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More interestingly, these migrant farm workers are relocated to villages where 
farmers have their own land usage rights. The two groups of farmers live right 
next to each other, yet in contrasting conditions. Most of the relocated landless 
farm workers live at the center of the village in houses built by Beigui, with a few 
living in company-built housing in the field. Local villagers, many of whom have 
become wealthy growing vegetables and other commercial crops, live in self-built 
houses on their own land, surrounded by coffee groves. Although these two 
groups of villagers do socialize with each other, a sense of distinction between the 
two was palpable through our conversations with both. 
Summary and Discussion 
In some rural areas in today's China, the central government's vision of a "second 
leap" into modern agriculture has become a reality. The household-based, small 
holding agricultural production reinstated by the HRS has been transformed into 
specialized, commercialized, vertically integrated and larger-scale agriculture that 
is competitive in export markets. Shouguang County in Shandong Province, for 
example, boasts the largest vegetable production base and vegetable trading 
market in the country, with hundreds of long-haul trucks departing daily to ship 
vegetables to all corners of the country. The entire county's farmland is fully 
covered by greenhouses for growing vegetables. Chenggong County in Yunnan, 
where agriculture has shifted entirely to commercial flower and vegetable 
production, now houses the largest flower trading and auction market in Asia, 
ships fresh-cut flowers to markets in neighboring Asian countries as well as the 
United States, and is projected in 10 to 15 years to become the biggest flower 
producing and exporting area in Asia, if not in the world.36 
In this process of modernization of China's agriculture, agribusiness 
companies of different sizes and various origins are playing a key role. 
Agribusinesses have provided stable markets for scattered and isolated small 
producers through either regular large-volume purchasing (as in Form 1, the case 
of Nestle and commercial coffee farmers) or formal contracting arrangements (as 
in Form 2, Xinchang Food and contract duck farmers), making specialized 
commercial farming a stable and viable option for otherwise risk-averse and 
vulnerable small producers. These companies have also directly entered 
agricultural production to organize larger-scale farming operations by renting and 
consolidating land, hiring laborers as farm workers, introducing new technologies 
and integrating farming vertically with food processing and marketing. In sum, 
the participation of agribusiness in China's agriculture has helped to realize the 
central government's goal in reforming the agricultural sector from subsistence 
based, small-scale and scattered to more specialized, market-oriented, larger-scale 
and vertically integrated. 
36 Keith Bradsher, "Bouquet of Roses May Have Note: 'Made in China'", The New York 
Times (25 September 2006). 
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Our research underscores how relationships between farmers and agribusiness 
firms are shaped by rural China's system of collective land ownership and 
individualized land use rights. This system has proven to be not only adaptable 
but, in fact, conducive to the development of rural markets and agricultural 
modernization. The separation of individualized land use rights from collective 
ownership facilitates the circulation of land and the consolidation of parcelized 
land into larger operations, paving the road for the scaled-up production needed 
by agribusiness. 
On the other hand, collective ownership protects agricultural producers?to 
various degrees?from domination, exploitation and dispossession by outside 
capital. Nearly all of the companies that we interviewed expressed a desire to 
expand their production bases. The primary barrier to expanding these bases is the 
lack of land?or, put in another way, the difficulty in wresting control of collective 
land from rural households. In fact, the many companies and entrepreneurs that 
have formed bases have had to do so on previously unproductive, marginal land. 
In many other countries, battles pitting powerful corporations against unorganized 
small farmers have led to smallholding farmers being dispossessed. In China, 
farmers' protected land rights provide them with a tool to resist pressure from the 
companies. As a result, agricultural modernization in rural China has progressed 
in the more equitable ways described in these pages. An army of landless 
vagabonds has not emerged. 
In our fieldwork, we found that the norms of collective land ownership are 
surprisingly strong. We did encounter farmers who complained bitterly at the deal 
that they received when their land was expropriated for urbanization (we also 
encountered farmers who liked their deals, the consistent income and the urban 
residence permit that this entailed). However, we encountered no cases where 
farmland was taken from farmers by agribusinesses to form agricultural 
production bases, in contrast with reports of persistent land grabs.37 In fact, 
interviews with government officials, company managers, entrepreneurs, scholars 
and farmers revealed the depth and strength of the norms and regulations 
protecting the rights of farmers to their land. Not only are such norms about the 
sanctity of farmers' entitlement to farmland backed by formal regulations and 
traditional practices but they have also acquired moral weight. Most informants 
were even shocked at the idea of trying to force the farmers to give up their land 
in order to pave the way for larger-scale agribusiness. 
To be sure, there were cases of companies throwing their political weight 
around. One entrepreneur used his pull with local authorities to have forested land 
reclassified as wasteland, allowing him to purchase it from the village and create a 
37 For studies on the seemingly rampant land grabs in rural China, see, for example, Xiaolin 
Guo, "Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China", The China Quarterly, No. 166 
(June 2001), pp. 422-39; Yongshun Cai, "Collective Ownership or Cadres' Ownership? 
The Non-Agricultural Use of Farmland in China", The China Quarterly, No. 175 
(September 2003), pp. 662-80. 
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privately owned and operated commercial orchard. He then used help from his 
brother-in-law, who was the village head, to form the base on favorable terms. 
Despite the use of company power, however, in no case did we encounter land grabs 
in order to form production bases. Some companies in Yunnan, unhappy with the 
restrictions they faced under China's collective land system, have even ventured 
into Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar to acquire land and expand their production. 
Critics may contend that, because collective ownership restricts companies 
from faster expansion, it slows down agricultural modernization, causes a loss of 
efficiency and thus should be scrapped in favor of privatization of farm land.38 
Under private land ownership, companies (or individual entrepreneurs) can 
mechanize farming more quickly by acquiring land without having to absorb any 
labor attached to it.39 Companies can then replace labor with machines in their 
expanded operation, which is believed to results in efficiency gains. 
This alleged efficiency gain, however, has not been substantiated empirically. 
Data have shown that, even in its miniscule scale, China's grain production has 
reached a level of per capita output comparable to that in the most developed 
countries, thanks to continued technological innovation and intensive labor 
input.40 Against this background, it is hard to see how replacing labor with 
machines could further increase labor productivity, let alone land productivity or 
total output.41 Even if it did, it is only efficiency-inducing from the capital 
owner's perspective. It certainly is not more efficient for the displaced laborers, 
and can cause efficiency loss for the country if land productivity and total output 
decline as a result of declining land-use intensity under mechanized farming. 
38 For English sources, see, for example, "How to Make China Even Richer", The 
Economist, Vol. 378, No. 8470 (2006), p. 11; Gershon Feder, Lawrence J. Lau, Justin Yifu 
Lin and Xiaopeng Luo, "The Determinants of Farm Investment and Residential 
Construction in Post-Reform China", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 
41, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1-26; Tom Miller, "Rural Reform Stays Silent on Land Rights", 
Financial Times (27 March 2006). Within China, land privatization remains a politically 
sensitive issue. Calls for land privatization are often not openly published. One vocal 
advocate for it is Hui Qin, see, for example, Hui Qin, "Nongmin diquan liulun" (Six 
Comments on Farmers' Land Rights), Shehui kexue luntan (Tribune of Social Sciences), 
Vol. 2007, No. 9 (2007), pp. 122-46. 
39 
Larger scales of production can also raise productivity through allowing easier adoption of 
technology, greater integration with the market and better management to reach 
standardization. As we have shown, however, these goals are equally achievable under the 
current system and thus do not give the privatized system any edge. 
40 Scott Rozelle, Jikun Huang and Keijiro Otsuka, "The Engines of a Viable Agriculture: 
Advances in Biotechnology, Market Accessibility and Land Rentals in Rural China", The 
China Journal, No. 53 (January 2005), pp. 81 -111. 
41 
Research suggests that privatization would bring minimal productivity gains to China's 
agriculture sector, and that the social costs of privatization in the absence of strong legal 
protections for farmers would be high, see Guo Li, Scott Rozelle and Jikun Huang, "Land 
Rights, Farmer Investment Incentives, and Agricultural Production in China" (Davis: 
University of California, Davis, 2000), Working Paper, pp. 1-24. 
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Furthermore, replacing labor with machines may not even be cost-saving for 
capital owners, as skilled farming labor is cheap and large farming equipment 
is expensive. 
Privatization of land would have detrimental effects on Chinese farmers. The 
very advantage which advocates of privatization cite?that of being able to use 
the land as collateral to obtain loans?is a primary mechanism through which 
banks, corporations and landlords in other countries have been able, legally, to 
dispossess farmers of their land. During inevitable downturns due to misfortune 
or poor weather, farmers with few other assets to service the loan face foreclosure 
on their land and ultimate landlessness.42 
This current study is limited in at least two aspects. First, we did not study the 
main grain-producing regions in central and northeastern China. One could argue 
that the flat topography and the less labor-intensive nature of growing staple 
grains make agriculture there different from the kind of labor-intensive commercial 
crops cultivation that we studied in Yunnan and Shandong. Cultivation of labor 
intensive cash crops can scale up without reduction in labor input, making it 
compatible with the current land system in rural China. However, scaling up the 
cultivation of staple grains, which is more compatible with mechanized 
production, may require sharp reductions in labor input?a process that is resisted 
under the current land system. Therefore, it is possible that agribusiness's entry 
into the cultivation of staple grains is discouraged by the current land system. We 
do not necessarily see this as a problem, however. 
We also omitted another equally important pathway to agrarian capitalism, the 
rise of entrepreneurial farmers.43 The same set of conditions that led to the growth 
of agribusiness has also encouraged entrepreneurial farmers to expand production 
through renting land and hiring labor. These entrepreneurs face many challenges, 
especially lack of access to capital. Entrepreneurial farmers also come in different 
forms, ranging from a single household to various forms of cooperatives. This 
important topic needs to be investigated in fixture studies. 
Thirty years ago, the HRS established the institution of household-based land 
use rights under collective ownership, giving Chinese farmers an economically 
inalienable entitlement to land?a crucial resource that is denied to farmers in 
most other countries. Today, even as many farmers turn to off-farm jobs, most 
maintain their land rights back home as insurance. Critics have worried that Deng 
Xiaoping's reforms would condemn China's farmers permanently to inefficient, 
low-tech, small-scale, traditional agricultural production. The shortcomings of the 
household responsibility system, together with policy changes unfavorable to the 
agricultural sector, led to rural stagnation in the 1980s. As a result, the government 
42 
See, for example, Anirudh Krishna, "Escaping Poverty and Becoming Poor: Who Gains, 
Who Loses, and Why?", World Development, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2004), pp. 121-36. 
43 
Xiaoming Guo, Zujun Liao and Rao Fu, "Longtou qiye daidong xing, zhongjie zuzhi 
liandong xing he hezuoshe yitihua sanzhong nongye chanyehua moshi de bijiao", offers a 
preliminary comparison of these two models of agricultural modernization. 
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has sought ways of expanding production through vertical integration and other 
forms of modernization. Current forms of agribusiness generally allow agricultural 
production to expand and modernize without eliminating the crucial institution 
that benefits hundreds of millions of farmers. Collective land ownership has 
proven to be a flexible system that allows agribusiness to grow through a variety 
of forms, while maintaining a modicum of rights and material benefits for 
China's farmers. 
